Abstract-Capacity formulas and random-coding exponents are derived for a generalized family of Gel'fand-Pinsker coding problems. These exponents yield asymptotic upper bounds on the achievable log probability of error. In our model, information is to be reliably transmitted through a noisy channel with finite input and output alphabets and random state sequence, and the channel is selected by a hypothetical adversary. Partial information about the state sequence is available to the encoder, adversary, and decoder. The design of the transmitter is subject to a cost constraint. Two families of channels are considered: 1) compound discrete memoryless channels (CDMC), and 2) channels with arbitrary memory, subject to an additive cost constraint, or more generally, to a hard constraint on the conditional type of the channel output given the input. Both problems are closely connected. The random-coding exponent is achieved using a stacked binning scheme and a maximum penalized mutual information decoder, which may be thought of as an empirical generalized maximum a posteriori decoder. For channels with arbitrary memory, the random-coding exponents are larger than their CDMC counterparts. Applications of this study include watermarking, data hiding, communication in presence of partially known interferers, and problems such as broadcast channels, all of which involve the fundamental idea of binning.
the problems of embedding and hiding information in cover signals are closely related to the Gel'fand-Pinsker problem: the cover signal plays the role of the state sequence in the Gel'fand-Pinsker problem [10] [11] [12] . Capacity expressions were derived under expected distortion constraints for the transmitter and a memoryless adversary [12] . One difference between the basic Gel'fand-Pinsker problem and the various formulations of data-hiding and watermarking problems resides in the amount of side information available to the encoder, channel designer (adversary), and decoder. A unified framework for studying such problems is considered in this paper. The encoder, adversary, and decoder have access to degraded versions , respectively, of a state sequence . Capacity is obtained as the solution to a mutual-information game where is an auxiliary random variable, and the and are subject to appropriate constraints.
In problems such as data hiding, the assumption of a fixed channel is untenable when the channel is under partial control of an adversary. This motivated the game-theoretic approach of [12] , where the worst channel in a class of memoryless channels was derived, and capacity is the solution to a maxmin mutual-information game. This game-theoretic approach was recently extended by Cohen and Lapidoth [13] and Somekh-Baruch and Merhav [14] , [15] , who considered a class of channels with arbitrary memory, subject to almost-sure distortion constraints. In the special case of private data hiding, in which the cover signal is known to both the encoder and the decoder, Somekh-Baruch and Merhav also derived random-coding and sphere-packing exponents [14] . Binning is not needed in this scenario. The channel model of [13] [14] [15] is different from but reminiscent of the classical memoryless arbitrary varying channel (AVC) [16] [17] [18] which is often used to analyze jamming problems. In the classical AVC model, no side information is available to the encoder or decoder. Error exponents for this problem were derived by Ericson [19] and Hughes and Thomas [20] . The capacity of the AVC with side information at the encoder was derived by Ahlswede [21] .
The coding problems considered in this paper are motivated by data-hiding applications in which the decoder has partial 1 or no knowledge of the cover signal. In all cases, capacity is achievable by random-binning schemes. Roughly speaking, the encoder designs a codebook for the auxiliary . The selected sequence plays the role of input to a fictitious channel and conveys information about both the encoder's state sequence and the message to the decoder. Finding the best error exponents for such schemes is challenging. Initial attempts in this direction for the Gel'fand-Pinsker DMC have been reported by Haroutunian et al. [22] , [23] , but errors were discovered later [24] , [25] . Very recently, random-coding exponents have been independently obtained by Haroutunian and Tonoyan [26] and Somekh-Baruch and Merhav [27] . Their results and ours [28] were presented at the 2004 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory.
The random-coding exponents we have derived cannot be achieved by standard binning schemes and standard maximum mutual information (MMI) decoders [16] , [18] . Instead, we use a stack of variable-size codeword arrays indexed by the type of the encoder's state sequence . The appropriate decoder is a maximum penalized mutual information (MPMI) decoder, where the penalty is a function of the encoder's state sequence type. The MPMI decoder may be thought of as an empirical generalized maximum a posteriori probability (MAP) decoder, just like the conventional MMI decoder may be thought of as an empirical MAP decoder.
This paper is organized as follows. A statement of the problem is given in Section II, together with basic definitions. Our main results are stated in Section III in the form of four theorems. An application to binary alphabets under Hamming cost constraints for the transmitter and adversary is given in Section IV. Proofs of the theorems appear in Sections V-VIII. All derivations are based on the method of types [29] . The paper concludes with a discussion in Section IX and appendices.
A. Notation
We use upper case letters for random variables, lower case letters for individual values, and boldface fonts for sequences. The probability mass function (pmf) of a random variable is denoted by , and the probability of a set under is denoted by . Entropy of a random variable is denoted by , and mutual information between two random variables and is denoted by , or by when the dependency on should be explicit; similarly we sometimes use the notation . We let and represent the set of all pmfs and empirical pmfs, respectively, for a random variable . Likewise, and denote the set of all conditional pmfs and all empirical conditional pmfs, respectively, for a random variable given . The notations , , and indicate that is zero, finite but nonzero, and infinite, respectively. The shorthands and denote equality and inequality on the exponential scale: and respectively. We let denote the indicator function of a set , and denote the uniform pmf over a finite set . We define and (the binary entropy function). We adopt the notational convention that the minimum of a function over an empty set is .
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Our generic problem of communication with side information at the encoder and decoder is diagrammed in Fig. 1 . Three versions , , and of a state sequence are available to the encoder, adversary, and decoder, respectively. We use the shorthand expression to denote the joint state sequence . This sequence consists of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples drawn from a pmf . The individual sequences are available noncausally to the encoder, adversary, and decoder, respectively. The adversary's channel is of the form . This includes the problems listed in Table I as special cases. The alphabets and are finite. A message is to be transmitted to a decoder; is uniformly distributed over the message set . The transmitter produces a sequence . The adversary passes through the channel to produce corrupted data . The decoder does not know selected by the adversary and has access to . The decoder produces an estimate 2 We allow the encoder/decoder pair to be randomized, i.e., the choice of is a function of a random variable known to the encoder and decoder but not to the adversary. This random variable is independent of all other random variables and plays the role of a secret key. The randomized code will be denoted by . To summarize, the random variables and have joint pmf
A. Constrained Side-Information Codes
A cost function is defined to quantify the cost of transmitting symbol when the channel state at the encoder is . This definition is extended to -vectors using . In information embedding applications, is a distortion function measuring the distortion between host signal and marked signal.
We now define a class of codes satisfying maximum-cost constraints (Definition 2.1) and a class of codes satisfying averagecost constraints (Definition 2.2). The latter class is of course larger than the former. We also define a class of randomly modulated (RM) codes (Definition 2.3), adopting terminology from [20] . Definition 2.2 is analogous to the definition of a length-information-hiding code in [12] . The common source of randomness between encoder and decoder appears via the distribution whereas in [12] it appears via a cryptographic key sequence with finite entropy rate. 2 At first sight, the problem setup could be simplified by eliminating the variable S S S and considering the "average channel" p where is chosen uniformly from the set of all permutations and is not revealed to the adversary. The sequence is obtained by applying to the elements of .
B. Constrained Attack Channels
Next we define a class of DMC's (Definition 2.4) and a corresponding class of channels with arbitrary memory (CAM) in which the conditional type of given is constrained (Definition 2.5).
Definition 2.4:
A compound DMC (CDMC) class is any compact (under norm) subset of .
For CDMCs, we have where . The set is defined according to the application.
1) In the case of a known channel [1] , is a singleton.
2) In information-hiding problems [12] , is the class of DMCs that introduce expected distortion between and at most equal to (2.3) where is a distortion function. can also be defined to be a subset of the above class.
3) In some applications, could be defined via multiple cost constraints. Given a pmf , we denote by the class of DMCs whose conditional marginal is in the CDMC class .
Definition 2.5:
The CAM class is the set of channels such that for any channel input and output , the conditional type belongs to with probability .5) i.e., feasible channels have total distortion bounded by and arbitrary memory. 3 Comparing the CDMC class and the CAM class , we see that 1) for in any given type class, the conditional pmf of given is uniform in the CDMC case but not necessarily so in the CAM case, and 2) while conditional types may have exponentially vanishing probability under the CDMC model, such types are prohibited in the CAM case. One may expect that both factors have an effect on capacity and random-coding exponents. As we shall see, only the latter factor does have an effect on random-coding exponents.
The relation between the CAM class in (2.5) and the classical AVC model [16] is detailed in Appendix A. The class (2.5) is not a special case of the classical AVC model because arbitrary memory is allowed.
We also introduce the following class of attack channels, which turn out to be the worst CAM channels for the problems considered in this paper. Definition 2.6: An attack channel uniform over single conditional types is defined via a mapping such that with probability , the channel output has conditional type . Moreover, is uniformly distributed over the corresponding conditional type class. 3 The case of channels with arbitrary memory subject to expected-distortion constraints admits a trivial solution: the adversary "obliterates" X X X with a fixed, nonzero probability that depends on D but not on N, and therefore, no reliable communication is possible in the sense of Definition 2.7 that follows.
Finally, given a type , we denote by the class of conditional types such that is in the CAM class .
C. Probability of Error
The average probability of error for a deterministic code when channel is in effect is given by (2.6)
For a randomized code, the expression above is averaged with respect to ; this average is denoted by . The minmax probability of error for the class of randomized codes and the class of attack channels considered is given by (2.7) Definition 2.7: A rate is said to be achievable if as .
Definition 2.8:
The capacity is the supremum of all achievable rates.
Definition 2.9:
The reliability function of the class of attack channels considered is (2.8) There are four combinations of maximum/expected cost constraints for the transmitter and CDMC/CAM designs for the adversary (four flavors of the generalized Gel'fand-Pinsker problem), and a question is whether same capacity and error exponents will be obtained in all four cases. We now define transmit channels, which play a crucial role in deriving capacity and error exponents. Given an alphabet of cardinality , we denote by the set of feasible transmit channels. Note that transmit channels have been named covert channels [12] and watermarking channels [14] , [15] in the context of information hiding. In those papers, the channel was called an attack channel; we retain this terminology for in this paper. Consider  a  sextuple  of  random  variables  with joint pmf  ,  where is an auxiliary random variable taking values in . The following difference of mutual informations plays a fundamental role in capacity analysis [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] of channels with side information. It plays a central role in the analysis of error exponents as well (2.9) Note that depends on only via the marginal ; moreover, the cardinality of the alphabet has been made explicit in the definition (2.9).
D. Preliminaries
Channel capacity for the problems studied in [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] is given by (2.10) where restrictions are imposed on the joint distribution of (including the absence of some of these variables, see Table 1 ), and the maximization over and minimization over are possibly subject to cost constraints. The cardinality of the alphabet may be unbounded ([15, p. 514]), 4 hence, the infinite range for in (2.10). To evaluate (2.10) in the case , Moulin and O'Sullivan [12] claimed that one can choose without loss of optimality. The proof is based on Caratheodory's theorem, as suggested in [1] . However, the proof in [12] applies only to the fixed-channel case. 5 The use of alphabets with unbounded cardinality introduces some technical subtleties. The following two lemmas are straightforward but will be useful. The proof of the first one is based on the nested nature of the feasible sets . Proof: Denote the left-hand side of (2.13) by and the argument of the limit in the right-hand side by
. We have where
Since the maximization (respectively, minimizations) defining (respectively, ) is over a dense subset of (respectively, ), we have Hence, .
Finally, recall that the Kullback-Leibler divergence [16] and related functionals (including mutual information and functionals) are continuous with respect to the norm. For instance, for any , any pmfs and with finite values of , and any , there exists such that where the norm on is the norm.
III. MAIN RESULTS
The main tool used to prove the coding theorems in this paper is the method of types [29] . Our random-coding schemes are binning schemes in which the auxiliary random variable is input to a fictitious channel.
In all derivations, optimal types for sextuples are obtained as solutions to maxmin problems. Two key facts used to prove the theorems are: 1) the number of conditional types is polynomial in , and 2) in the CAM case, the worst attacks are uniform over conditional types, as in Somekh-Baruch and Merhav's watermarking capacity game [15] . Proof of the theorems appears in Sections V-VIII. Related, known results for CDMCs without side information are summarized in Appendix B.
The expression (2.10), restated below in a slightly different form, turns out to be a capacity expression for the problems considered in this paper (Theorems 3.6 and 3.7)
By application of Lemma 2.1, the sequence is nondecreasing in .
In the special case of degenerate (no side information at the encoder and decoder), it is known that the maximum above is achieved by , and capacity reduces to the standard formula If and (private watermarking), the optimal choice is again , and For any value of , the random-coding error exponent of (3.3) is achieved by a binning code with conditionally constant composition and the MPMI decoder. We now present a brief overview of this scheme and an interpretation for the MPMI decoder.
A. Random-Coding Exponents for CDMC Model
For notational simplicity, here we use the shorthand to denote the type of the encoder's state sequence (recall there is a polynomial number of such types). Let , where the value of is arbitrary. Referring to Fig. 2 , to each value of corresponds an array (3.5) of codewords, drawn uniformly from some optimized type class. We refer to as the depth parameter of the array . The codebook is the union of these arrays. Each array has exponential size, but the number of arrays is polynomial in .
The array depth parameter is designed to optimally balance the probability of encoding error and the probability of decoding error, conditioned on the encoder's state sequence type . Upon seeing and , the encoder evaluates the type of and seeks a codeword that belongs to some optimized conditional type class . Let denote the empirical mutual information associated with . An encoding error arises when no codeword can be found in the conditional type class . The probability of that event does not vanish when but vanishes at a double-exponential rate when . The probability of decoding error increases exponentially with . Therefore, the optimal tradeoff is given by . Instead of choosing as a function of , a suboptimal design would be to fix the value of and draw all the codewords uniformly and i.i.d. from a single type class . The scheme would then be more akin to the original Gel'fand-Pinsker binning scheme, which uses a single array of codewords (drawn i.i.d. from a pmf ). When is fixed, the fact that a polynomial number of equal-size arrays is used rather than a single array is inconsequential as far as error exponents are concerned.
The MPMI decoder is matched to the selected random binning scheme. Given , the MPMI decoder seeks the codeword in that achieves the maximum of the penalized empirical mutual information criterion (3.6) As the proof of Theorem 3.2 indicates, the penalty is optimal among all functions of ; the optimal penalty is thus matched to the array depth parameter.
The MPMI decoder may be thought of as an empirical generalized MAP decoder. Indeed, all messages are equiprobable, and the encoding procedure ensures that for any given type , all bins are equiprobable as well. The probability of the pair is thus equal to for all . Hence, given , the a priori distribution of the codewords is uniform Therefore (3.7)
We may write (3.8) where denotes an empirical pmf or empirical conditional pmf. Substituting (3.7) and (3.8) into (3.6), we obtain (3.9) This may be thought of as an empirical version of the generalized MAP decoder (3.10) which requires knowledge of the channel from to . We do not know whether the generalized MAP decoder is as good (on the exponential scale) as the optimal MAP decoder (3.11) which averages out the nuisance parameters
and is more difficult to analyze.
The MPMI decoder is matched to the encoding scheme in that the same function is used as the depth parameter of the array and as the penalty in the decoding function. As the proof of Theorem 3.2 indicates, any other choice of the penalty function would in general result in a lower error exponent. This is not surprising in view of the above generalized MAP interpretation.
B. Random-Coding Exponents for CAM Model
We now turn our attention to the CAM channel model. First, we state the following lemma, which is analogous to Lemma 3.1. ; iii) (monotonicity in ).
Theorem 3.4:
For the CAM case (Definition 2.5) with maximum-cost constraint (2.1) or expected-cost constraint (2.2) on the transmitter, the reliability function is lower-bounded by the random-coding error exponent For any value of , the random-coding error exponent (3.12) is achieved by a randomly modulated code with conditionally constant composition, stacked binning, and an MPMI decoder. The worst attack channel is uniform over single conditional types (Definition 2.6).
C. Comparison of Random-Coding Exponents for CDMC and CAM Models
For both the CDMC and the CAM models, it should be noted that:
1) the worst type classes , and best type class (in an appropriate sense) determine the error exponents; 2) the order of the and is determined by the knowledge available to the encoder. The encoder knows and can optimize , but has no control over ; 3) the straight-line part of results from the union bound; 4) random codes are generally suboptimal at low rates. Theorems 3.2 and 3.4 imply the following relationship between error exponents in the CDMC and CAM cases. Proof: Fix . Using the relation we write where we have defined the marginal conditional pmf as shown at the bottom of the page. Since is an element of in (3.12), defined above is an element of and may be viewed as a functional of (for fixed and ). Hence, the cost function in (3.12) may be written as where the equality follows from the chain rule for divergence. Thus, the cost functions in (3.12) and (3.3) are identical; the only difference is the domain over which the minimizations are performed. In (3.3), the minimization over is unconstrained, and the minimization over is over . In (3.12), the minimization over is constrained to the set , and is a fixed element of once is fixed. In other words, the minimization in (3.3) is over a larger set, and we have Taking the limits of both sides of this inequality as , we obtain . Similarly, from Lemma 3.3, we have taking limits as , we obtain .
The inequality is not as surprising as it initially seems, because the proof of Theorem 3.4 shows there is no loss in optimality in considering CAMs that are uniform over conditional types, and there are more conditional types to choose from under the CDMC model. Generally, that additional flexibility is beneficial for the adversary, and the worst conditional type does not satisfy the hard constraint (2.4). See Section IV for an example.
Remark 3.1:
In the absence of side information (degenerate ), the optimal , and (3.13) becomes . The expression for derived by Hughes and Thomas [20, eqs. (9) , (6) , also see the observation on top of p. 96] is upper-bounded by ; they also provide a binaryHamming example in which equality is achieved. Our result implies that the upper bound is in fact achieved for any problem without side information in which there exists a hard constraint on the conditional type of the channel output given the input.
D. Capacity
As discussed in Section II-D, Gel'fand and Pinsker's proof of the converse theorem in [1] can be extended to more complex problems such as compound Gel'fand-Pinsker channels [12] , [15] . The capacity for the generalized Gel'fand-Pinsker problem is given in Theorems 3.6 and 3.7, respectively. Achievability of follows from Theorems 3.
The proof of the CDMC converse is similar to that in [12] ; the proof in the CAM case exploits the close connection between the CAM and CDMC problems.
E. Remarks on Cardinality of
The sequence defined in (3.2) is nondecreasing and converges to the capacity limit , but one may ask at what rate. When the feasible set has finite cardinality, by application of Caratheodory's theorem, it suffices to select (see [15] , [30] for related problems). When is a compact set, one may construct a sequence and a sequence of subsets of that is dense in the norm:
This may be done, for instance, by applying a uniform quantizer to each to obtain . By continuity of the functional , the effect of this quantization on can be made arbitrarily small by letting . Finally, Caratheodory's theorem can be applied to the set of attack channels so that is achieved using . Proposition 3.8 formally states this result when the feasible set of attack channels is defined by the distortion constraint (2.3). For the random-coding exponent , the idea is similar but the derivations are more involved because Kullback-Leibler divergence is not absolutely continuous with respect to its arguments; attack channels that lie on the boundary of the probability simplex require a special treatment.
In Proposition 3.10 below, the random-coding exponent is viewed as a function of and, with a little abuse of notation, written as . The random-coding exponent when the alphabet has size is similarly denoted by .
Lemma 3.9:
The function is continuous and nonincreasing in .
The preceding statement is a consequence of the fact that the Kullback-Leibler and mutual-information functionals are continuous in their arguments, and that the sets are continuously nested. 
IV. BINARY-HAMMING CASE
In this section, we consider a problem of theoretical and practical interest where is a Bernoulli sequence with , transmission is subject to the cost constraint (2.1) in which is Hamming distance, and the adversary is subject to the expected-distortion constraint (2.3) or to the maximum-distortion constraint (2.5), in which is also Hamming distance. In both cases, the set is given by (2.3). We study three cases:
. This problem is analogous to the public watermarking problem of [8] , [9] , [12] .
Case II:
. This is the private watermarking problem of [12] . The CAM version of this problem is closely related to a problem studied by Csiszár and Narayan [17] and Hughes and Thomas [20] . Case III: Degenerate side information:
. Unlike [17] , [20] , the attacker's noise may depend on . In all three cases, we were able to derive some analytical results and to numerically evaluate error exponents. Capacity formulas for these problems are given below and illustrated in Fig. 3 .
In this section we use the notation .
A. Case I: Public Watermarking
Here and , so we have . Capacity for a fixed-DMC problem (adversary implements a binary-symmetric channel (BSC) with crossover probability ) is given in Barron et al. [8] and Pradhan et al. [9] if if if (4.1) where and is the binary entropy function. The straight-line portion of the capacity function is achieved by time sharing. Proposition 4.1 shows that the BSC is the worst channel for the CDMC and CAM classes considered.
Proposition 4.1:
Capacity under the CDMC and CAM models defined by the distortion constraints (2.3) and (2.5), respectively, is equal to and is achieved for . Proof: See Appendix C.
Proposition 4.2:
The random-coding error exponent is a straight line in the CAM case: for all . The minimizing in (3.12) coincides with , the maximizing , and the minimizing is the BSC with crossover probability . Proof: See Appendix D.
Unlike the CAM case, in the CDMC case we have no guarantee that is optimal for random-coding exponents. The exponents and are shown in Fig. 4 for the case , and ; see Section IV-D for details of these calculations. For the CDMC case, we have found numerically that the worst attack channel is the BSC with crossover probability , and that the worst case in (3.4) coincides with . 
B. Case II: Private Watermarking
Here . [12] . Capacity is given by (4.2) and is achieved when .
Proposition 4.3:
For the random-coding exponents, we have no guarantee that is an optimal choice. The exponents and in that case are shown in Fig. 5 for the case . As in Case I, for both the CAM and CDMC cases, the worst case in (3.3) and (3.12) coincides with . The capacity expression (4.2) was also derived for the AVC problem of Csiszár and Narayan [17] , albeit with different assumptions ( , i.e., degenerate side information, and channel state selected independently of , see Appendix A). Error exponents for the latter problem were derived by Hughes and Thomas [20] . They obtained at all rates below capacity. 
C. Case III: Degenerate Side Information
Here .
Proposition 4.4:
Capacity is the same as in the public watermarking game:
. Proof: See Appendix E.
Proposition 4.5:
for all . Proof: Follows from Remark 3.1.
Unlike Case I and Case II, the worst attack is an asymmetric binary channel, favoring outputs with low Hamming weight. Error exponents in the case , are given in Fig. 6 .
D. Discussion
Comparing Figs. 4 and 5 , we see that the random-coding error exponents for are only slightly larger when side information is available to the decoder. For instance, the zero-rate expo-nents are and at rate zero in the CDMC case; and and in the CAM case. Some practical comments about the optimization problems solved in this section are in order. Among these problems, the calculations of random-coding exponents for the CDMC/public watermarking scenario are the most complicated ones, both of which have four layers of minimization or maximization. The number of the parameters to be optimized is (one for for , two for and for ). Other difficulties arise due to the lack of nice properties such as everywhere differentiability and convexity. There appears to be a substantial increase of computational difficulty going from to larger . Based on the analytical results derived above, it is tempting to conjecture that is a sufficient choice for optimality; unfortunately, at this time we are unable to validate that conjecture analytically or numerically.
We have used a genetic algorithm [32] to numerically solve the above-mentioned optimization problems. Advantages of genetic algorithms include easy implementation, robustness with respect to selection of starting points, no need for evaluation of function derivatives, and ability to handle high-dimensional problems. The parameters of a genetic algorithm may be selected to ensure that the algorithm is globally convergent. In particular, we have used an "elitist" genetic algorithm, in which the value of the best individual in each iteration is nondecreasing for a maximization problem (or nonincreasing for a minimization problem). The sequence of the best solutions in each iteration is guaranteed to converge to the global optimum almost surely [32] , [33] . We shall prove the existence of a sequence of codes such that
The proof is given for the maximum-cost constraint (2.1) on the transmitter. Any code that achieves the error exponent is therefore also feasible under the weaker average-cost constraint (2.2). A random ensemble of binning codes is constructed, and it is shown that the error probability averaged over this ensemble vanishes exponentially with at rate . Since the error probability functional is continuous in (by (2.6)) and the feasible set of attack channels can be approximated with arbitrary precision (in the norm) by a subset whose cardinality is polynomial in , there exists a code from the ensemble that achieves uniformly over . It is therefore sufficient to prove that Consider the maximization over the conditional type (viewed as a function of ) in (5.5). As a result of this optimization, we may associate the following:
• to any type , a type class and a mutual information
• to any sequence , a conditional type class
• to any sequences and , a conditional type class A random codebook for is the union of codebooks indexed by the state sequence type (recall there is a polynomial number of types). The codebook is obtained by a) drawing random vectors independently from the uniform distribution over , and b) arranging them in an array with columns and rows. The design of the function is arbitrary at this point but will be optimized later.
Encoder. The encoding (given and ) proceeds in two steps.
1) Find such that . If more than one such exists, pick one of them randomly (with uniform distribution). Let . If no such can be found, generate uniformly from the conditional type class .
2) Generate uniformly distributed over the conditional type class . Clearly, the pmf of , conditioned on its joint type, is uniform, and the encoder's maximum-cost constraint (2.1) is satisfied.
Decoder. Given , the decoder seeks that maximizes the penalized empirical mutual information criterion (5.6)
The decoder declares an error if maximizers with different column indices are found. Otherwise, the decoder outputs the column index of . The penalty function in (5.6) will soon be optimized, resulting in the "matched design"
. We now analyze the probability of error of the decoder.
Step 1. An encoding error arises under the following event: and for (5.7) conditioned on message being selected. The probability that a vector uniformly distributed over also belongs to is equal to on the exponential scale. Therefore The inequality (5.8) follows from . The doubleexponential term in (5.9) vanishes faster than any exponential function.
Step 2. We have a decoding error under the following event : conditioned on message being selected, there exists not in column of an array such that Therefore (5.10) (5.11)
We will see in Step 3 that does not depend on for the MPMI decoder. Using the asymptotic relations and [16] , we derive (5.12)
Step 3. Next we evaluate , which can be written as , where is an arbitrary member of the conditional type class . Denote by the probability that the decoder outputs the codeword in row and column of the array , conditioned on , and . This conditional error probability is independent of . We have , and the number of conditional types is polynomial in . Next we use the following inequality, which is proved in Appendix F. where (5.24) holds because and can be optimized to achieve the exponent in (5.5).
Step 5. By Lemma 3.1, the function is nonnegative and upper-bounded by . Applying (2.13) with and in the roles of the variables , and the functional , respectively, we conclude that the exponent in (5.25) converges to the limit in (3.3) as . Since for all , the probability of error vanishes if . The claim follows from the fact that we can choose such that , for any arbitrarily small .
VI. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.4
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.2 and is again given for the maximum-cost constraint (2.1) on the transmitter. A random ensemble of binning codes with fixed is constructed. This ensemble may also be viewed as a random ensemble of randomly modulated (RM) codes (Definition 2.3). RM codes are obtained by selecting a prototype from and generating the RM family according to Definition 2.3. For RM codes there is no loss of optimality in restricting the attack channel to a class of channels that are uniform over conditional types (see Step 2 below). It is shown that the error probability averaged over the ensemble vanishes exponentially with at the rate given in (3.12). Since the class of attack channels considered in Step 2 has polynomial complexity, there exists an RM code that achieves for all attack channels in . The codebook-generation, encoding, and decoding procedures are the same as those in the CDMC case, with the difference that the types and conditional types generated/selected by the encoder are obtained by optimizing a slightly different payoff function. The probability of error analysis is similar as well.
Assume . Define which differs from (3.12) in that the optimizations are performed over empirical pmfs instead of arbitrary pmfs. Consider the maximization over (viewed as a function of ) in (6.2). As in the proof of Theorem 3.2, to the resulting optimal we can associate a type class , conditional type classes , and , and a mutual information . Define and as in (5.23). The random codebook is a stack of codebooks , each of which is obtained by a) drawing independent random vectors whose components are uniformly distributed in , and b) arranging them in an array with columns and rows. Encoder. The encoding (given and ) proceeds exactly as in the CDMC case.
1) Find such that . If more than one such exists, pick one of them randomly (with uniform distribution). Let . If no such can be found, generate uniformly from the conditional type class . 2) Generate uniformly distributed over the conditional type class . Decoder. The decoder is the MPMI decoder of (5.6) . We now analyze its probability of error
Step 1. An encoding error arises when no codeword with the appropriate type can be found. The probability of this event is given by (5.9).
Step 2. We have a decoding error under the following event : there exists not in column of an array such that . Therefore Here we can apply the following argument from [15] . From (6.3) and (6.4), we see that is an affine functional of . Moreover, it can be verified that where is a permutation operator, and
By uniform averaging over all permutations , we obtain an attack channel which is strongly exchangeable: if is uniformly distributed over a type class, then is uniformly distributed over conditional class types. So without loss of optimality for the adversary, we can consider only strongly exchangeable channels in the analysis, for which is given by (6.5) with to be optimized. Using the upper bound (6.6) and the asymptotic relations and , we obtain (6.7)
Step 3. This step is identical to the corresponding step in the DMC case and yields (6.8)
Step 4. Combining (6.3), (6.7), (5.9), and (6.8), we obtain (6.9) because was optimized to achieve the exponent in (6.2).
Step 5. The last step is identical to that in the DMC case: the exponent in (6.9) converges to the limit in (3.12) as , and all rates below are achievable. By choosing large enough, can be made arbitrarily close to .
VII. PROOF OF CONVERSE OF THEOREM 3.6
The proof of the converse theorem is an extension of [12, Proposition 4.3] . To prove the claim (derive an upper bound on capacity), we only need to consider the expected-cost constraint (2.2) for the transmitter. Indeed, replacing (2.2) with the stronger maximum-cost constraint (2.1) cannot increase capacity, so the same upper bound applies. Likewise, we assume as in [12] that the decoder knows the attack channel , because the resulting upper bound on capacity applies to an uninformed decoder as well.
Step 1. Choose an arbitrary small . For any rateencoder and attack channel such that
we have where the first inequality is due to Fano's inequality, and the second is due to (7.1). Hence
We conclude that the probability of error is bounded away from zero (7.2) for all . Therefore, rate is not achievable if
Step 2. The joint pmf of is given by (7.4) Define the random variables
Since forms a Markov chain for any , so does (7.6) Also define the quadruple of random variables as , where is a time-sharing random variable, uniformly distributed over and independent of all the other random variables. The random variable is defined over an alphabet of cardinality Due to (7.4) and (7.6), forms a Markov chain.
Using the same inequalities as in [1, Lemma 4] (with and playing the roles of and , respectively), we obtain
Using the definition of above and the same inequalities as in [12, eq. (C16)], we obtain (7.8) where is defined over an alphabet of cardinality Therefore (7.9) where the last equality follows from Lemma 2.1. Combining (7.3) and (7.9), we conclude that is not achievable if which proves the claim, because is arbitrarily small.
VIII. PROOF OF CONVERSE OF THEOREM 3.7
The proof of the converse theorem builds on the proof for the C-DMC case.
Step 1. Consider an attack channel that achieves in (3.1). Without loss of generality, assume that for all . For any positive , consider the following neighborhood of :
We have . For any arbitrarily small , there exists such that In order to prove the converse theorem, it is sufficient to show that reliable communication at rates is impossible for a particular attack channel
The channel we select is "nearly memoryless." Given any rate-randomized code , we show that hence, is nonzero.
Step 
IX. DISCUSSION
In their landmark paper, Gel'fand and Pinsker [1] showed that random binning achieves the capacity of a DMC with random states known to the encoder. However, their encoder was not designed to provide positive error exponents at rates below capacity. In this paper, we have addressed this limitation and proposed and optimized a new random-coding scheme. The codebook consists of a stack of codeword arrays indexed by the encoder's state sequence type . The size of these arrays is , i.e., the number of rows is a function of . The decoder is the MPMI decoder (3.6), where the penalty is the same function that determines the array sizes. This new MPMI decoder can be interpreted as an empirical generalized MAP decoder.
The channel models studied in this paper generalize the original Gel'fand-Pinsker setup in two ways. First, partial information about the state sequence is available to the encoder, adversary, and decoder. Second, both CDMC and CAM channel models are studied.
We have considered four combinations of maximum/expected cost constraints for the transmitter and CDMC/CAM designs for the adversary, and obtained the same capacity in all four cases. There is thus no advantage (in terms of capacity) to the transmitter in operating under expected-cost constraints instead of the stronger maximum-cost constraints.
In terms of error exponents, however, there is a definite advantage to the adversary in choosing a CDMC rather than a CAM design of the channel. This is because 1) arbitrary memory does not help the adversary because randomly modulated codes and a MMI-type decoder are used, 2) the set of conditional types the adversary can choose from is constrained in the CAM case but not in the CDMC case, and 3) the error exponents are determined by the worst types. The random-coding exponent is always upper-bounded by a straight line with slope at all rates below capacity. That upper bound is achieved in the CAM case, when no side information is available to the encoder.
Finally, neither the MMI nor the MPMI decoder is practical, and it remains to be seen whether good, practical encoders and decoders can be developed.
APPENDIX A RELATION BETWEEN CAM AND AVC MODELS
In this appendix, we detail the relation between a channel model , with maximum distortion constraint (2.5), and the AVC model in [16] . The AVC is a family of conditional pmfs , where (finite set) is a "channel state" selected by the adversary. A cost function for the states is also defined. The channel law is of the form
where the sequence is arbitrary except for a maximum-cost constraint
In some formulations of the jamming problem, must be selected by the adversary before seeing ; in other formulations, is allowed to depend on but not on other samples of [17] , [20] ; yet in other formulations (the A*VC model [16] ), is allowed to depend on for all . If is allowed to depend on the entire sequence in a noncausal manner (as opposed to the above formulations of the AVC problem), the problem with maximum distortion constraint (2.5) may be formulated as (A1) and (A2) with state , channel , and cost defined below. Let where and , hence . Let
The maximum-cost constraint (A2) is then equivalent to the maximum-distortion constraint (2.5), with . The sequence may be chosen deterministically or stochastically, using an arbitrary distribution.
APPENDIX B ERROR EXPONENTS FOR CHANNELS WITHOUT SIDE INFORMATION
This appendix summarizes some known results on randomcoding error exponents.
Single DMC: Let and be the channel law and input pmf, respectively. Referring to [16, which is zero if .
Private Watermarking: the set is defined by the distortion constraint (2.3). Then [14] (B3) where The maximization over is also subject to a distortion constraint.
Jamming with channel state selected independently of input [17] , [20] , we have The set , denoted here as , is the set of DMCs that introduce maximum Hamming distortion . Let the attack channel be the BSC with crossover probability . Considering may not be the worst channel, we have
where the last step is derived in [8] , [9] . The function is defined in (4.1).
Next In the case , capacity is achieved using time sharing: . Similarly to [8] , it can be shown that is a nondecreasing concave function of . Hence
For all values of , letting in (D2) and further restricting the minimization over , we have
Combining (D5), (D6), and (D.7), we obtain (D2).
Step 2. The first two bracketed terms in (D1) are nonnegative. This yields a lower bound on (D8) where the equality is due to (D2).
(D4)
Step 3. If we fix and restrict to be of the form , we obtain an upper bound on (D9)
Step 4. Combining (D9) and (D8), we obtain .
APPENDIX E PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.4
We have (E1) Let and , which satisfy the distortion constraints Substituting these probabilities into (E1), we obtain Solving the above max-min problem in the case , we obtain the optimal and from
After some algebraic simplifications, we obtain . Applying the same time-sharing argument as in the proof of Proposition 4.1, we obtain , which is the same as the capacity for the public watermarking game. 
We need to prove that for all and . In Step 1 below we establish that . In
Step 2, we prove that . Step 1. The function describes a hyperplane tangent to the graph of at . The function may be written as
It is convex and therefore , owing to the hyperplane separation theorem.
Step 2. which, combined with (F8) and (F7), will establish (F6). Putting , we apply the inequality to claim that which proves (F8). The proof is complete.
